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POSTSCRIPTS
Mexican Divorces
In a 1964 annulment action, Rosenstiel
v. Rosenstiel,1 the New York Supreme
Court declared that a Mexican divorce de-
cree, procured at a proceeding at which
the husband had appeared personally and
the wife had appeared by attorney, was in-
valid. The court held that domicile of one
of the parties was a prerequisite for juris-
diction and, since no domicile had been es-
tablished, the Mexican court could not
have validly entertained the suit.2
An analysis of this decision, published
in the Summer 1964 issue of The Catholic
Lawyer, emphasized the need for "an ap-
pellate confrontation with the question of
whether domicile is the sine qua non of
recognition" of foreign divorce decrees,
and concluded that "because of the many
social interests involved, the requirement
of domicile is deserving of some definitive
interpretation. '3
1 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1964).
2 Further support for the decision rested upon an
alleged violation of Section 51 of the New York
Domestic Relations Law, which prohibits agree-
ments "to alter or dissolve a marriage." For a
thorough discussion of this statute, recently re-
enacted as Section 5-311 of the General Obliga-
tions Law, see Note, Separation Agreements and
New York Public Policy, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 138
(1965).
1' 0 CATHOLIC LAW. 255, 260 (1964).
This clarification was provided by the
Court of Appeals decision affirming the
appellate division's reversal of Rosenstiel.4
The Court, while admitting that the physi-
cal contact with the foreign jurisdiction
was ephemeral, 5 and that in the past dom-
icile has been heavily emphasized as a pre-
requisite to compulsory recognition,6 con-
cluded that "a balanced public policy now
requires that recognition of the bilateral
Mexican divorce be given rather than with-
held and such recognition as a matter of
comity offends no public policy of this
State."'
In light of this decision, the concept of
domicile has lost much of its former sig-
nificance as a jurisdictional prerequisite in
divorce actions. Stating that "domicile is
not intrinsically an indispensable prerequi-
site,"" the Court found that compliance
with the one-day Mexican residence re-
quirement was sufficient to give the foreign
court jurisdiction. In Wood v. Wood, the
companion case to Rosenstiel, the Court
went a step further. It upheld a divorce de-
4Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209
N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
5 Id. at 72, 209 N.E.2d at 711, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
6 Id. at 73, 209 N.E.2d at 712, 262 N.Y.S. 2d at 90.
7 Id. at 74, 209 N.E.2d at 713, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
8 Id. at 73, 209 N.E.2d at 712, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
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cree in which jurisdiction over the parties
had been based upon mere submission to
the court by the physical appearance of
one party and the appearance of the at-
torney of the other. The Court in Rosenstiel
compared the six-week Nevada residence
requirement with the one-day Mexican re-
quirement and concluded that, since both
Mexico and Nevada have no real interest
in the foreign marriages which their courts
purport to dissolve, no distinction should
be drawn by New York with regard to rec-
ognition. Rather, the decrees of both
should be recognized.
Judge Desmond, concurring only in the
result, took issue with the majority's com-
parison:
As to analogizing the one-day Mexican
divorce to the six weeks' Nevada decree,
the first and ready answer is that judgments
from other States are given faith and
credit here because the Federal Constitu-
tion so commands. The second answer is
a substitution of the true analogy that is,
between one-day foreign divorces and post-
card foreign divorces, as between which
there is no logical or real difference at all.,
Dissenting, Judge Scileppi suggested that
the drastic consequences of the invalida-
tion of bilateral Mexican divorce decrees
could be avoided by making the decision
only prospective in application. Prospec-
tive application should be used only in
cases where the public interest compels,
and such an interest was present in this
case.
The enormity of this public interest,
which both the majority and the dissent
recognized, is largely due to the great
number of New Yorkers who have been
granted Mexican divorces. The fact that
11 Id. at 77-78, 209 N.E.2d at 715, 262 N.Y.S.2d at
94.
so many have resorted to foreign laws to
obtain divorce decrees has been cited to
indicate the need for reform in our own
matrimonial legislation. Such reform may
soon be forthcoming. The 1965 New York
Legislature established the Joint Legislative
Committee on Matrimonial and Family
Law.1 In the fall of 1965, the first legis-
lative hearings on divorce in New York in
at least a century were held. From these
hearings could be seen the development
of an attitude toward the abandonment of
fault as a basis for divorce in favor of a
new test, viz., a showing that there has
been an irreparable breakdown in the mar-
riage relationship. A compulsory recon-
ciliation period was also recommended as
a prerequisite to any final decree of
divorce.
It is to be hoped that the ultimate result
of these hearings will be the enactment of
more realistic divorce laws, so that such
evasions of the law as resorted to by the
parties in the instant case will become less
prevalent.
Birth Control Legislation
The Winter 1961 issue of The Catholic
Lawyer included a discussion of the Con-
necticut birth control statute' in which the
10 154 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1965, p. 1, col. 3-4.
1 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-32 (1959): "Any
person who uses any drug, medicinal article or in-
strument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or im-
prisoned not less than sixty days nor more than
one year or be both fined and imprisoned." (Em-
phasis added.) CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 54-196
(1959): "Any person who assists, abets, counsels,
causes, hires or commands another to commit any
offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he
were the principal offender."
author stated that "practical reason may
suggest that Connecticut modify its legis-
lation.' 2 The fact that modification was in
order was clearly recognized in June 1965
in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut,3
wherein the United States Supreme Court
held the Connecticut birth control statute
unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice Douglas, delivering the opin-
ion of the Court, found a constitutional
objection to a law "forbidding the use of
contraceptives rather than regulating their
manufacture or sale. . .. -4 The marital
relationship was declared to be within a
"zone of privacy created by several fun-
damental constitutional guarantees."' The
objection to the Connecticut statute was
that in making the use of contraceptives a
crime, the state had violated the "zone of
privacy" surrounding the marital relation-
ship.
In a recent New York case,6 the court
was presented with an alleged violation of
the former New York birth control statute.'
The court held Griswold not controlling,
stating that: "The Griswold case merely
decided that the statutes concerning the
2 Regan, The Connecticut Birth Control Ban And
Public Morals, 7 CATHOLIC LAW. 5, 10 (1961).
3381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4 Id. at 485 (italics of the Court). It should be
noted that the Connecticut statute was unique in
that it was the only such statute in the United
States making use of contraceptives a crime. See
Note, Birth Control Legislation, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 245, 248 (1960).
'Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965).
6 People v. Baird, 47 Misc. 2d 478, 262 N.Y.S.2d
947 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1965).
7Laws of New York 1881, ch. 676. The New
York statute made it a crime to sell, lend, give
away or manufacture any recipe, drug or medi-
cine for the prevention of conception or for caus-
ing unlawful abortion. The use of contraceptives,
however, was not proscribed.
11 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1965
subject matter, as they are written in the
statute books of . . . Connecticut, are
unconstitutional."" In distinguishing the
provisions of the New York statute from
those of the Connecticut statute, the court
noted that New York provided an excep-
tion in the case of doctors,9 while the Con-
necticut statute made no such exception."0
Thus, under the New York statute, a
doctor could prescribe the use of contra-
ceptives for the prevention or cure of
disease, and druggists could sell such
devices on prescription," while no statu-
tory or case-law exception was found in
Connecticut.
However, the constitutional objection to
the Connecticut statute was not, as the
New York court appears to suggest, that
no exception was provided for doctors.
Rather, the statute was held violative of the
constitutionally protected right of privacy
inherent in the marital relationship because
the use of contraceptives was made a
crime. Thus, the former New York statute
would probably have been held constitu-
tional as a valid exercise of the police
power since it was directed against the
manufacture and distribution of contra-
ceptives rather than their use.1
2
A recent amendment to the New York
statute has, however, obviated the problem
for all practical purposes in New York.' 3
8 Supra note 6, at 480, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
9Supra note 7.
10 State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856
(1940).
11 People v. Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 637
(1918).
12 See People v. Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 163 N.Y. Supp.
682 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
13N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1142. This statute became
effective September 1, 1965. People v. Byrne was
decided under the old statute since the alleged act
took place before the effective date of the new
statute.
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Under the new statute, devices and medi-
cine for the prevention of conception may
be sold by licensed pharmacies without
prescription to persons sixteen years of
age or older. The prohibition of sales to
minors under the age of sixteen years
would appear to be a valid exercise of
the police power since the state has an
interest in protecting the morals of chil-
dren and may, in pursuit of that interest,
legislate more strictly in their behalf.
The present New York attitude toward
birth control legislation is both realistic
and practical. It is realistic in that it recog-
nizes the fact that many people see no
moral objection to family planning by
means of artificial birth control. Further,
the effect on community morals of the
private use of contraceptive devices has not
been determined, and arguments that a
proliferation of such devices will result in
a general lowering of moral standards are
highly speculative. In the practical realm,
the New York statute obviates the difficult,
if not impossible task of enforcing a statute
which regulates the manufacture and sale
of contraceptives.
It is not suggested that the state is with-
out power to legislate in the area of
artificial birth control. On the contrary, in
the exercise of the police power a state
may properly regulate the manufacture,
sale and distribution of birth control de-
vices to protect the health, welfare and
morals of its citizens. While New York
has apparently adopted the position that
the sale of artificial birth control devices
will not be inimical to health, welfare and
morals of its citizens, another state may
very well determine such sale to be con-
trary to what it deems best for its citizens.
On policy grounds a state may proscribe
the manufacture or distribution of artificial
birth control devices, or closely regulate
such manufacture or distribution if it deter-
mines this to be necessary.
It is suggested that, in the final analysis,
the legislature must determine whether or
not the manufacture and distribution of
artificial birth control devices are to be
regulated, and if so, to what extent. On the
other hand, the determination as to wheth-
er or not such devices should be used is to
be made by the individual, according to
the dictates of his conscience and in the
exercise of his chosen religion.
